山东大学博弈论与经济行为研究中心（RCGEB）2015年度课题公开招标事项如下：

一、招标课题：

1. Monderer and Shapley (1996, GEB) introduced the notion of a potential for non-cooperative games, which is a powerful tool for characterizing and calculating Nash equilibria in general and pure-strategy Nash equilibria in particular. Their paper provides a complete characterization (necessary and sufficient conditions) for when a game has a potential. Bayesian games consist of a broader class of games. How to extend the notion of a potential these games and when do they have a potential?（2015RCGEB01）

2. In Cournot markets, mergers can harm the merging firms, in the sense that post-merger profits of the merged firm may be smaller than the joint profits of the merging firms prior to the merger. This is known as the “Merger Paradox”. In ordinary Cournot markets, the paradox always holds with linear demand and cost functions. On the other hand, cross-holdings are ubiquitous in practice. What are the possible effects of cross-holdings on the merger paradox? How should the structure of cross-holdings between firms be modified post-merger?（2015RCGEB02）

3. Empirical analysis of pre-merger versus post-merger analysis with cross-holdings. Do cross-holdings promote mergers?（2015RCGEB03）

4. 自由选题（博弈论、实验经济学、产业组织理论领域）（2015RCGEB04）

二、招标和研究要求

1、申请人须具有相关研究基础，具备完成课题研究的能力与时间保障。

2、申请人须以“山东大学博弈论与经济行为研究中心”为独立或第一署名单位发表SCI/SSCI检索期刊论文2篇。

3、申请人须定期到山东大学博弈论与经济行为研究中心报告研究进展，进行学术交流活动，每年不少于2次。

4、课题完成时间：3年

5、资助经费：5万元/项

三、招标程序

1、申请人如实填写申请书，并于2015年12月15日将申请书发送至rcgeb.sdu@hotmail.com，邮件主题请注明“RCGEB课题招标”。

四、联系方式

联系人：王燕

电话：0531-88363351

E-mail：rcgeb.sdu@hotmail.com

地址：山东省济南市山大南路27号 山东大学中心校区知新楼B410

山东大学博弈论与经济行为研究中心

邮编：250100

课题招标申请书