政治经济学

本科生全英文课程

山东大学经济学院

授课教师：马驰骋

电子信箱:macc@sdu.edu.cn

课程描述:

本课程介绍政治经济学的经典理论与最新研究进展。主要内容包括：制度、法律、腐败、国家、政府和官员、战争与冲突、恐怖主义、种族暴力，以及改革等。课程目的在于扩展学生对政治经济学研究领域的认识及培养对政治经济学的学习兴趣。

课程形式:

课程将采用教师讲授与学生研讨相结合的形式。学生需在课前阅读指定材料，并鼓励参与课堂讨论。

课程材料:

本课程没有单一指定教材。课程材料包括课程大纲所列的论文和著作章节；其中，* 表示指定阅读材料，而没有标注* 的表示选读材料。课程材料的影印电子版将在每节课前一周上传至课程网站(www.course.sdu.edu.cn)，同时会通过Email发送给每一位同学。

学生成绩:

最终成绩包括三部分：课堂参与(20%)，短论文(30%)，和期末考试(50%)。其中，课堂参与包括学生在课堂上回答问题和对某一问题进行讨论，以及对一篇指定论文进行评论并在课堂上进行报告。短论文是指学生对指定学术论文进行的评述，包括综述（文章的研究问题、主要理论假设、研究方法以及主要结论）和学生自己做出的评价两部分；共有两篇短论文要求提交，每篇论文的长度不超过两页纸（WORD，A4）。期末考试为闭卷，考题范围为课程大纲中的指定阅读材料（带*号）。

课程大纲与阅读材料:

1. 政治经济学简介

Besley, Tim. “The New Political Economy.”The Economic Journal, 117 (524).

Weingast, Barry R., and Donald A.Wittman, 2006. “The Reach of Political Economy.” InThe Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman,Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2. 制度与发展

* North, Douglass C. 1990.Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (pp. 3-11)

* Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2004. “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth.” NBER Working Paper 10481. (pp. 1-2, 11-28)

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2002. “Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution.”Quarterly Journal of Economics. 107(4).

3. 制度的起源与变迁

* Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2004. “Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth.” NBER Working Paper 10481. (pp. 29-37, 61-72)

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.”American Economic Review, 91(5).

Sokoloff, Kenneth L. and Stanley L. Engerman. 2000. “History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World.”Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14(3).

4. 政治发展的路径

* North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009.Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (pp. 1-2, 13-29)

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2005.Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (pp. 1-14, 30-42 of Chapters 1 and 2)

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared. 2008. “Income and Democracy.”American Economic Review, 98 (3).

Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy.”American Political Science Review, 53(1).

5. 法律体系

* La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2008. “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins.”Journal of Economic Literature. 46 (2). (pp. 285-291, 326-327)

Glaeser, Edward L. and Andrei Shleifer, 2002. “Legal Origins.”Quarterly Journal of Economics. 117 (4).

Posner, Eric A.Law and Social Norms. Harvard University Press.

Miguel, Edward, and Raymond Fisman. 2007. “Corruption, Norms and Legal Enforcement: Evidence from Diplomatic Parking Tickets.”Journal of Political Economy, 115(6).

6. 政治纽带与腐败

* Mara Faccio. 2006. “Politically Connected Firms.”American Economic Review, 96(1). (pp. 369-373)

* Li, Hongbin, Lingsheng Meng, and Junsen Zhang. 2006. “Why Do Entrepreneurs Enter Politics? Evidence from China.” Economic Inquiry, 44(3). (pp.559-566)

* Treisman, Daniel. 2000. “The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study.”Journal of Public Economics. 76. (pp. 399-407, 437-442)

Li, Hongbin, Lingsheng Meng, Qian Wang, and Li-An Zhou. 2008. “Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms.”Journal of Development Economics, 87.

Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1994. “Politicians and Firms.”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(4).

Shleifer, Andrei and Robert Vishny. 1993. “Corruption.”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (3).

Mauro, Paulo. 1995. “Corruption and Growth.”Quarterly Journal of Economics. 110(30).

Fisman, Ray. 2001. “Estimating the Value of Political Connections.”American Economic Review, 91.

7. 国家、政府与官员

* Besley, Tim, and Torsten Persson. 2010. “State Capacity, Conflict, and Development.”Econometrica, 78(1). (pp. 1-4)

* Porta, Rafael La, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. 1999. “The Quality of Government.”Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 15(1). (pp.222-234, 265-266)

* Li, Hongbin, and Li-An Zhou. 2005. “Political Turnover and Economic Performance: The Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China.”Journal of Public Economics, 89. (pp. 1743-1747, 1760-1761)

Bates, Robert H. 2006. “The Role of the State in Development.” InThe Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman,Oxford: Oxford University Press.

8. 战争与冲突

* Blattman, Christopher and Edward Miguel.2010. “Civil War.”Journal of Economic Literature. 48(1). (pp.1-22, 37-44)

Bai, Ying, and James Kung. 2011. “Climate Shocks and Sino-nomadic Conflict.”Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(3).

Kung, James, and Chicheng Ma. 2012. “Can Cultural Norm Reduce Conflicts? Confucianism and Peasant Rebellions in Qing China.” Working paper.

学生报告1

9. 恐怖主义与种族暴力

* Krueger, Alan B., and Jitka Maleckova. 2003. “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There A Causal Connection?”Journal of Economic Perspectives, 17(4). (pp.119-123, 141-142)

* Reynal-Querol, Marta, J. G. Montalvo. 2005. “Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil War.”American Economic Review, 95(3). (pp.796-797, 811-812)

Gould, Eric D., and Esteban F. Klor. “Does Terrorism Work?”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(4). (pp. 1459-1463, 1507-1508)

Abadie, Alberto. 2005. “Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism.”American Economic Review, 95(4).

Fearon, James D., and David D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.”American Political Science Review, 97(1).

Voigtlander, Nico, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2012. “Persecution Perpetuated: The Medieval Origins of Anti-semitic Violence in Nazi Germany.”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3).

10. 改革

* Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2011. “The Consequences of Radical Reform: The French Revolution.”American Economic Review, 101(7). (pp.3286-3295)

*Xu, Chenggang. 2011. “The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development.”Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4).(pp.1076-1098, 1139-1144)

* Lin, Justin Yifu, 1992. “Rural Reforms and Agricultural Growth in China.” American Economic Review, 82(1). (pp. 34-39, 47-50)

Roland, Gérard. 2000.Transition and Economics: Politics, Markets and Firms. MIT Press.

学生报告2

（阅读材料中的数学模型与计量分析部分不要求掌握）