How to Persuade a Group: Simulaneously or Sequentially
赵昕，澳大利亚悉尼科技大学商学院经济系研究员，多伦多大学经济学博士。主要研究领域为微观经济学与政治经济学.曾在Journal of Regulatory Economics, Review of International Economics, Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics等国际期刊发表文章。
This paper studies how a privately informed persuader should persuade a group of listeners if the listeners can imperfectly verify his information at a cost. Should he bring the listeners together and persuade them simultaneously or communicate with them sequentially? The answer depends on the verification costs of the listeners. Simultaneous persuasion outperforms sequential persuasion when it is not very costly for the listeners to verify the persuader’s information. The opposite can be true if verifying the persuader’s information is very costly. In sequential persuasion, it is optimal for the persuader to first approach the listener who is hardest to persuade. For both persuasion modes, in the persuader-optimal equilibria, the persuader pools extreme private information, and “truthfully reveals” moderate private information.